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ABSTRACT 
The end of the Cold W ar has led to a much larger focus on ethnic and religious 
differences rather than ideological ones. This new era of international politics has indeed 
seen a proliferation of clashes between different ethnic and religious groups. It is said that 
the West is looking for a new enemy and that the most immediate of these is Islam. 
Islamic fundamentalism and the aggression associated with it is seen as a threat by many 
in the West. Events related to Islamic fundamentalism are receiving enormous media 
coverage in the Westem press. The reaction of most Westem countries to such events and 
Islam in general is negative. The perception of the West in many Muslim countries is also 
negative. Problems due to modemisation are blamed on the West who is perceived to be 
trying to undermine Islamic culture and civilisation. Both spheres in fact are having 
extreme factions set as the norm to represent the majority. The historical interaction 
between the two have led to an accumulation of negative images of the 'other'. This 
situation, however, is being challenged by the Islamic presence in Europe. Since the 
Muslim population in the continent is today accepted as being permanent, Europeans are 
trying to find better ways of living with their Muslim minorities. In order to do this they 
have to understand each other in a more objective manner to find solutions to growing 
social problems which may lead to a more general, even global, coming to terms of the 
two spheres. 
This study aims to examine the perceptions and misperceptions of the West and 
the Muslim world, and examine the experience of the Islamic presence in Westem 
Europe. It first focuses on the historical encounters of Europe and the Muslim world and 
how historical images have been passed on to the present day. Thenit examines how the 
West today perceives the Muslim world, and the attitudes of European countries towards 
their Muslim minorities. It also examines the perception of the Muslim world regarding 
the West and how Muslims in Europe perceive the 'host' states they are living in. 
Another emphasis is the position ofMuslims in Westem Europe and how European states 
are dealing with their Muslim populations. Their legal status and certain models of 
dealing with the Muslim populations, mainly that of assimHation and ethnic minorities -
integration, are given consideration. 
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ÖZET 
Soğuk Savaşın bitmesi ideolojik farklılıklara nazaran etnik ve dini farklılıklara 
çok daha fazla odaklanılmasına yol açmıştır. Gerçekten de yeni uluslararası ortarn 
değişik etnik ve dini grupların çatışmalarının çoğalmasına tanık olmuştur. Batının yeni 
düşmanlar aradığı ve bunların başında da İslam'ın geldiği söylenilmektedir. İslami 
köktendincilik ve bununla özdeşleştirilen şiddet Batı' da birçok insan tarafindan tehdit 
olarak görülmektedir. Batı medyasında İslami köktendincilik ile ilgili olaylar çokça ele 
alınmaktadır. Çoğu Batılı ülkenin bu tür olaylara ve genel olarak İslam'a gösterdiği 
tepki olumsuzdur. Müslümanların çoğunlukta olduğu birçok ülkede de Batı'nın algılanış 
şekli olumsuzdur. İslam kültür ve uygarlığını sarsmaya çalıştığı varsayılan batı, 
modernizasyonun getirdiği sorunlar için de suçlanmaktadır. İki kesim de aslında aşırı 
uçları geneli temsil edercesine algılamaktadır. Batı ve İslam dünyasının tarihsel 
etkileşimi birbirleri ile ilgili olumsuz imajların birikmesine yol açmıştır, ama bu durumu 
Avrupa'daki Müslüman toplulukların varlığı etkilemektedir. Bügün kıtadaki Müslüman 
nüfusun kalıcı olduğu kabu1 edildiğinden Avrupa'lılar Müslüman azınlıkları ile 
yaşamanın daha iyi yollarını aramaktadırlar. Büyüyen sosyal problemlere çözüm bulmak 
için birbirlerini daha objektifbir biçimde anlamak zorunda kalrnaktadırlar. Bu da Batı ve 
İslam dünyasına daha genel, uluslararası anlamda ortak bir anlaşma zemini hazırlayabilir. 
Bu çalışma Batının ve Müslüman dünyasının birbirlerini algılama biçimlerini ve 
Batı Avrupa'daki Islami varlığı incelerneyi amaçlamaktadır. İlk olarak Avrupa ve 
Müslüman dünyasının tarihsel etkileşimlerini ve tarihsel imajların nasıl bügüne kadar 
ulaştığını incelernektedir. Sonra, Batının Müslüman dünyasını nasıl algıladığı ve Avrupa 
ülkelerinin Müslüman azınlıkianna olan tavırları incelenmektedir. Ayrıca, 
Müslümanların çoğunlukta olduğu ülkelerin Batı'yı, ve Avrupa'daki Müslümanların 'ev 
sahibi' ülkeleri nasıl algıladığı incelenrnektedir. Müslümanların Batı Avrupa'daki 
durumları ve Avrupa ülkelerinin Müslüman nufusları ile nasıl ilgilendikleri 
wrgulanrnaktadır. Yasal statüleri ve, başlıcaları asimilasyon ve etnik azınlık­
entegrasyon modelleri olmak üzere, Müslüman topluluktarla ilgilenrne modelleri 
üzerinde durulmaktadır. 
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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
lt is argued that the New World order involves the confrontation, or the clash 
of two or more civilisations. 1 It is said that the West, as it was during the Cold W ar 
period, now left alone without an immediate riva! will or has found its new enemy or 
riva! embodied in Islam and the countries in which it is the major religion. 2 The 
argument, basically, is that the conflict between ideologies which has plagued world 
politics since the beginning of the century will be replaced by the conflict or "clash" 
between civilisations and even as a clash between religions (Islam and Christianity) in 
the post Cold War era. lt is being argued that the lack of strong ideologies or the 
decreasing number of adherents to them shall strengthen the importance of ethnic and 
religious differences throughout the world and that this shall culminate in a large scale 
conflict that will shape world politics. 3 
Although such theories have not become a reality and seemingiy will not in the 
foreseeable future, the elimination of Cold W ar tensions have actually put ethnic and 
religious tensions in a sharper focus. The world has defınitely become more sensitive 
to such issues. This can clearly be seen in the wide media coverage that Islamic 
fundamentalism and events related to it have been getting in recent years. Even though 
such a sensitivity may be the result of a shift in focus, meaning that the phenomena 
was always there - alıeady taking place and that it only received coverage after the 
previous focus lost iınportance, it may be said that this shift has aggravated tensions 
between the West and the Islamic World, or that the lack of an ideology that people 
can rely on and grip onto has increased fundamentalism in the domain of religion. 
Considered either way there is a clear and increasing tendeney towards clashes 
between the West and the Islamic world, between secular and religious. This situation 
is both evident on the wider international scale and also at the national level upon 
which Turkey may be given as an example of a country in which the Cold W ar years 
struggle , conflict and even killings between right and left have left the battleground to 
a fight betwetm secularists and non-secularists. In such an example it could be 
plausible to depict secularists as representatives of Westem and European values and 
non-secularists as those who represent Islamic values and ambitions. 
The initial instances of confrontation between Islam and Christianity may be 
traced to the fırst years of the emerging Islam. This confrontation was with the 
Byzantine empire and with the Christian state in Ethiopia Initially Islam was seen as a 
Christian heresy, hence its affinity to the Old Testament. The notable coming face to 
face of Islam and Europe which started to make a place in the European consciousness 
was during the 800 year rule of Musliıns in Southem Spain during which most of the 
lberian peninsula and Narbonne in Southem France was occupied. The invasion 
started in AD 711, and by AD 716 they had expanded into Southem France.4 The 
Musliıns tried to extend their raids further into France but these raids were stopped at 
Poiters. 5 These were the last years of the Ummayad dynasty of caliphs which finally 
collapsed in 750 and was replaced by the Abbasid dynasty. The Islamic presence in 
Spain lasted until 1492 during which a great deal of scientific interaction took place 
between Europe and the Islami c state. Much of the Greek heritage was transferred to 
Europe together with new technical and scientific innovations in this period. This 
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more or less had a considerable impact on and nurtured the European Renaissance that 
took place in the 1 Sth and 1 6th centuries. This fırst confrontation between Europe and 
Islam was one of conquest and reconquest. Getting the Muslims out of Europe and 
keeping them out was to engrave itself into the heads of many Europeans. On the 
other hand securing a place in Europe was to show itself in the actions of Muslim 
rolers who were to come later on and were already showing signs of such sentiment in 
the last years of the Al-Andalus at the other end of the continent Europe, this time 
embodied in the Westward thrust of the Ottoman Turks. 
Before giving a mention of the European - Islam encounter through the 
Ottoman existence in Europe another major encounter between Europe and Islam, the 
Crusades, holds an important place in the forming of a Christian perception of Islam 
and vi ce versa. The religious fervour of the 1 Oth and 1 1 th centuries coupled with the 
taking of Jerusalem by the Turks in 1076 prepared grounds for collective action of 
Europeans against the Muslim world. This, however, does not mean that the idea of 
the Crusades was purely motivated by the push of religion; economic and social 
factors also had an effect. The Byzantine army had been defeated by the Muslim Turks 
at Manzikert in 1071 and were showing signs ofweakness. The 1 Ith century was also 
a period of relative wealth for the people of Westem Europe. An increase of security 
for the people of the continent meant that there were fewer seats for ambitious young 
nobles resulting in increased fighting among the aristocracy. This situation 
necessitated the diversion of aggressive behaviour among groups within Europe on a 
common foe. This, of course, could only be done through what constituted a common 
denominator among the European Kingdoms, the Church led by the Pope in Rome. 
Although the Crusade called by Pope Urban II in 1095 culminating in the capturing of 
J erusalem in 1099 is known to be the first of the series, the h elp of Frankish Knights 
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to Spanish Christians against Muslims are also considered as the beginnings of the 
Crusades. After the capturing of Jerusalem in 1099 there is deseribed to have taken 
place eight other Crusades. The city was recaptured by Muslims in 1187 by Saladin. 
The seizure of the Holy lands by the Muslims and the recapturing of them was largely 
seen at the time through the glaze of chivalry and Romanticism. This can be widely 
seen in the literature of Westem Europe in the following centuries. Although histories 
from the West have denounced the Crusades as was justified on Christian principles 
and have negatively criticised the who le phenomenon the remaining perception of the 
Christians that has come down to this day seems to be as the Crusades being 
associated with war or any kind of action taken up against a common public evil. 6 
As the close encounter of Europe and Islam in Andalussia was diminishing in 
the early 15th century and ended in 1492, the other end of Europe was meeting a new 
and even more military Islam with the rapidly expanding Ottomans at the expense of 
the Byzantine Empire. The "Osmanli" family which was a smail part of the many 
Turkish tribes that moved into Anatolia during the 1 1 th and 12th centuries was to 
become a vast empire that stretched from Gibraltar to the Red Sea and from Crimea to 
what is today Austria and Poland. Embarked ona constant ')ihad" (holy war) against 
the Christian world, expansion in Europe was one of their major interests. Most of the 
Ottoman system was more or less based on expansion, and as far as Europe was 
concemed they experienced this until the Ottomans reached what may be called the 
middle of Europe, Vienna. Expansion was a continuation of the quest to have Islam 
embrace the whole world, and Ottoman administration was organİsed for the 
promotion of the same. Europe, however, saw this as the re-emerging of Muslim 
aggression and it brought back the fears of earlier centuries. 7 This is clearly seen in 
Martin Luther' s "Calling for Prayer against the Turks" which was published in 154 I 
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and in which there is invaluable material covering the negative image of Turks, and 
Islam in general at that time.8 Some ofthese perceptions have lived until this day. The 
Ottoman empire was a member of the European state system and acted with and 
reacted against other European powers. lt formed alliances with Christian states in line 
with its interests. With the taking of Constantinople in 1453, a traumatic event in 
Christian history and which had a great impact on the forming of misperceptions of 
the Europeans about Islam, there seemed to remain no obstacles in the taking of the 
continent. Although Muslim, the Ottomans were considered a part of Europe, bence 
the expression "sick man of Europe" which was used for the empire during the last 
years of its decline. The empire gradually was shared among European powers and 
finally left its place to the Turkish Republic in 1923. 
The Christian - Muslim encounters and confrontations experienced during the 
period of colonialism, outside Europe, also had effects on the perceptions of the two 
groups upon one another. During this period which lasted until well after World W ar 
II most of the Muslim world as we know it today came under European rule. A big 
portion of the Islamic presence in Europe today is because of the European heritage in 
these Muslim countries and the immigration of these people to Europe. Incentives 
were political and most of all economical. After the second world war thousands of 
Muslims moved to Europe seeking jobs and political refuge and today there is a 
growing presence of around seven million Muslims on the continent.9 To some this 
poses a threat to a Christian Europe, to others it is not worth mentioning. 
Within the argument of clashing civilisations or religions, Europe stands out as 
a region which is most sensitive to what is called Islamic Fundamentalism. 10 In 
addition to this there is a substantial number of people of the Islamic faith living in 
Westem Europe and it is growing in number day by day due to fast reproduction and 
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the continuing of the coming of immigrants from ex-colonies and other Muslim 
countries. Because immigrants, in this case Muslim immigrants, have not blended into 
the 'host' countries' culture successfully, most Muslims in these countries have been 
able to remain culturally and religiously intact. This makes possible for the coming 
face to face of Islam and Europe, the supposed post Cold W ar enemies-poles, in 
everyday life and their interaction. This of course is within the context of a dominant 
European 'host' culture. AssimHation and even integration being rather difficult in the 
European context has led individual European countries to give a more or less special 
treatment to Islamic groups within their borders. Therefore extensive sociological 
research has been undertaken to understand these people and their religion better, to 
keep tensions down, provide a certain degree of integration and prevent certain events 
from turning into a problem. 11 The two groups are having to learn how to live together 
despite their differences, to understand the misunderstandings, misperceptions, of 
each other. 
Islam is the faith which seems directly at odds with the West at the moment, 
especially in terms of lslamic fundamentalism - a movement that is partially aimed at 
undermining some Westem values. The deepest fault lines that are mentioned by 
Samuel P. Huntington to divide the world civilisations are that of the West and Islam, 
despite there being other "borders" mentioned. 12 These are two religions said to be "of 
the book" which have the highest population of followers. In the past few decades, the 
spheres of Judaism and Christianity have been getting along quite well, despite some 
marginal Neo-Nazi movements, whereas Fundamentalist Islam and the West have not. 
Iran, the living example of a Fundamentalist lslamic state, has rarely been on good 
terms with the West (although trade has flourished), and the West, especially 
European countries have repeatedly expressed their fears of possible fundamentalist 
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takeovers in countries like Algeria and Turkey, and to some degree Egypt. They have 
not expressed the same fears for a possible fundamentalist Hindu, Buddhist or 
Christian uprising in any country. This is simply because of the fact there does not 
exist such a serious threat. 
Throughout history no other religious group has pursued a persistent expansion 
or will of expansion into Europe other than Muslim forces. At least no other group 
had a religious motivation to expand into the Christian Europe. This is one of the most 
important reasons for the intensity of misperceptions and direct negative feelings of 
Europeans towards Islam rather than another religion. 
Within Europe, Muslims constitute the highest population of people having a 
very distinct culture other than that of Westem Europe. The Jewish population, 
however, is much more a part of the European culture and value system, though not a 
part of the dominant religious culture. Muslims again stand out. Islam is also said to 
be on the rise in Europe, and together with other factions Islamic fundamentalism is 
too. The search for identity and recognition especially of the second and later 
generation Muslims in Europe has led some of them into the realms of extremism, 
especially when faced with such phenomena as racism and other forms of 
discrimination. 13 
lt may be briefly stated that Islam and the West have not come to sympathise 
much with each other throughout the years but the European experience may show 
that the two may find common ground for cooperation. Europe, to some as the 
opposite extreme of what the Islami c world represents, may come to be the context in 
which the two blocs shall find ground for a better understanding of each other, the 
tessening of misperceptions and negative feelings, and leam to live together. Islamic 
groups' learning to live peacefully within Europe could provide hopes, and form a 
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model of interaction for countries where the majority of the population is Muslim to 
get on better with Europe and the West in general; where relations are already not bad 
there stili may be a chance for a higher degree of interaction and cooperation through 
this better understanding. This process seems to be possible in three ways which may 
be stated as follows: 
1- Assimilation: the complete transformatian into European culture, as one 
extreme. 
2- Modification: Europeans' completely complying to the desires of Muslim 
groups, as another extreme, and 
3- Integration: the finding of a mid way by both groups, a form of living 
peacefully through cooperation, ata point in the middle of the spectrum. 
Starting off from the argument Samuel P. Huntington puts forth in his "Clash 
of Civilisations" the aim of this thesis is to explain that such an expected clash 
between Islam and the West, which in today' s world are started to be seen as the new 
contenders in another Cold War and are separated from each other by deep "fault 
lines", does not necessarily have to take place on such frontiers. Europe has a growing 
Islami c presence within i ts own borders incorporating Islam' s extreme and moderate 
groups. This thesis shall attempt to explain how each group perceives the other, that 
these perceptions have more or less a negative nature, and because one of the "sides" 
is living within the other, mutual understanding is a necessity. 
Having given a very brief history of the confrontation of European and Islami c 
forces which has led to the prevailing misunderstandings of today, what the 
perceptions of the West (of the Europeans) are of Islam and Islami c groups living in 
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Europe shall be dealt with in chapter two. The opposite shall be dealt with in chapter 
three; how the Islamic world and the Islamic presence in Europe perceives the 
Westem and European reality in which they are living. The coming to terms of the 
two shall be dealt with in chapter four. How the two have had to live together in 
Europe and how a working solution for the problems caused by Muslim minorities in 
Europe had to be found shall be discussed. The chapter shall try to show that living 
together may decrease and actually has decreased the amount of misperception and 
negative feelings. A deeper interest of each group in the other due to increased 
interaction through coexistence has started to help in the diminishing of second 
thoughts about the other group. 
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CHAPTER2 
WESTERN PERCEPTIONS 
The Westem perception of Islam has been in the making since the first 
encounters centuries ago. These encounters of Europe and Muslim forces set the 
foundations for the mostly negative perceptions of today. Islamic expansion into 
Europe was a terrorising threat to the existence of the European ci viiisation that had 
come to exist since the Roman Empire and adopted Christianity. What was Christian 
had to be taken back. The efforts to reconquer Spain proved to be successful and that 
of the Holy Lands was partially successful. European authorities !ike the Church 
found the expansion of Islam into the continent as a means to unite the kingdoms of 
Europe. The coming together of European kingdoms against Islam occurred on a 
number of occasions but finally at the Ottoman siege of Vienna The first of these took 
place in 1529 and the last in 1683. Europe seemed vulnerable to the onslaught of an 
alien culture and religion. Martin Luther depicts the coming of the Turks as follows in 
the advice he gives to Germans fighting against the Turks: 
"If you go fighting against the Turks be sure that you 
shall not fight against flesh and blood, against a human; 
do not doubt! I wish to be your prophet and say: One 
Turk shall kill many a Christian. Think that you are face 
to face with an army of devils because the army of the 
Turks is a great army of devils. Thus, do not rely on 
your shield, mace, sword, strength and number; Satan 
shall not ask why we as humans continuously lose 
lO 
against the Turks and why the Turks always triuınph 
even though we are fighting against humans."1 
Luther gives the most negative and frightening of images in a period when Europe 
was religion - wrought. The writings of Martin Luther in the 16tlı century when Sultan 
Süleyman was ruling the Ottoman Empire are important in the forming of perceptions. 
The reasons for this is because Luther's writings express the fear component of 
Europe's perceptions towards Islam. The Ottomans, under the rule of Süleyman were 
in their most powerful period and Europe was fearing a wider expansion. This was the 
furthest any Islamic state could territorially penetrate Europe and fears were at a 
maximum. In his "Army Preaching Against the Turks", in addition to trying to support 
his thesis against the Vatican and gaining support for Protestantism he also tries to 
motivate the Germans to fight against the Turks by giving a negative image of them 
and comparing them to the Vatican. 2 He states that "no Kingdom has spread wrath and 
death like the Turks.'.J Luther goes on to justify war against Turks and their religion 
by revealing that one who fights against the Turks fights God's enemy, fights people 
who look down upon Jesus and, briefly, fights the devi!; and states that "One who kilis 
a Turk should not have a bad consciousness, he should think he has killed the enemy 
ofChristianity and relieve himself. Muhammed and the Turkish sultan having priority, 
all Turks have the soul of Satan. "4 Luther' s message spread because his works were 
printed, thus the fear and negative image of the Turks and Islam were also spread. 
When the lslamic forces were powerful there did exist another, rather positive, 
view of the Islamic world and the East in general. This image of the Orient was of a 
more developed and rich part of the world as depicted in the Ta/es of a Thousand and 
One Nights. This view was accompanied by a fear of the same. As the last Islamic 
power, the Ottoman Empire crumbled into pieces , lost its power, and as Europe 
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gradually came to dominate world politics and was in a superior position, the Islaınic 
world became associated with other images. In addition to the Muslim being seen as a 
cruel, aggressive, blood thirsty and sexually obsessed person, qualities like 
backwardness and other inferiorities were also given to him as labels. Much of this 
was due to ınisunderstanding and deliberate labelling. The perception in the West, of 
Islam today according to Andrea Lueg is as follows: 
" ... [ with titles like] 'The sword of Islam', 'The Islaınic 
Threat', 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', 'The Green 
Peril', 'lslam's New Battle Cry' ... authors seek to 
explain Islam to us ... Islam is seen as a monolithic 
bloc, and often directly or indirectly equated with 
Islamic fundaınentalism - the 'true Islam'. Simplifıed 
and undi:fferentiated descriptions of Islam in the media 
fan the flaws of vague fears of a supposed threat to 
Westem culture, and create a hostile image of Islam. 
For a long time the Islami c Middle East was 
seen as the polar opposite to the West and as the enemy 
of Christianity. Even today the region remains alien to 
the average citizen, making it difficult to place news 
reports on the area in the proper context. Hardly 
anything on the Middle East, or on histoncal clashes or 
points of contact between the East and West, is teamed 
in school s. Instead of knowledge or at least an unbiased 
examination of Islamic societies, we have cliches and 
stereotypes, which apparently make it easier to deal 
with the phenomenon of Islam. The Westem image of 
Islam is characterised by ideas of aggression and 
brutality, fanaticism, irrationality, medieval 
backwardness and antipathy towards women."5 
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2.1. ISLAMIC AGGRESSION 
Above all, Islam is seen as a religion that is aggressive. This is one of the 
oldest perceptions of Islam in Europe since its encountering Islam was mostly through 
war. The concepts of 'Dar al Islam', the part of the world which is being ruled by the 
laws of the Koran, and the concept of 'Dar al Har b', the realm of chaos and evil and 
theareayet to be conquered, the domain ofwar and the non-Islamic world, split the 
world into two.6 Islam does not foretell the existence of a state in its modem nation 
state form, let alone the lack of a notion of several Islamic states. The world of Islam 
is seen as a whole. Islam justifies the conquering of Dar al Harb with the concept of 
'Jihad'. According to A Glossary of Islamic Terminology fıhad in the context ofwhat 
could be aggressive means "A holy war in the cause of Allah and his commands ... 
physically fighting against the enemies of Allah ... "7 
It is such aspects of Islam that have been exploited by both Muslims and 
Christians. Islamic groups and even states (like Iran) have declared jihad for their own 
political needs. Islam has been criticised to be an aggressive, conquest hungry religion 
full of hatred for those of other religions. It is said to embody a rhetoric of conquest 
and victory but not defeat. So Islam is the 'one who started it', it is the aggressor 
against the Westem world and is to blame. The Islamic world, once strong, but today 
weak, longs for the days when it was great, when it covered lands stretching over 
continents. So today we stili hear people declaring jihad against the West in 
remembrance of past glories. Together with the notions of Dar al Islam and Dar al 
Harb that today exist only as concepts in Islamic thought and which tend to show the 
Islamic world as a monolithic block, the West has no reason to see any other than 
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itself as the target of an aggressive entity which uses such aggressive rhetoric. The 
notion of jihad, holy war, often shows up in events, violence and terrorist acts 
intended to bring down modernising and secular regimes and cause hann to the 
Westem states that support them. Saddam Husain used the term to legitimise what he 
di d during the Gulf W ar and to gather support from other Islamic countries even 
though he was the leader of a rather secular govemment. While some Islamic 
countries supported him others did not. Nevertheless, a high ranking Saudi Arabian 
legal scholar announced the allied fight against Iraq as Jihad. 8 This comes to show 
how the term Jihad can be exploited and be used to justify ones own rights. Some 
scholars have seen the term as a constant duty to spread the religion, others have 
stated that it merely means the defending of it, yet some like to interpret it as a means 
for religious perfection, the war with ones own inner enemies, most probably a sufi 
interpretation. However, what appeals to the West is the aggressive interpretation of 
jihad because this interpretation poses a more imminent threat and is more easily 
consumed in the media. 
A total war by Muslims against the West is unlikely to happen in the 
foreseeable future, but the silent threat of jihad does contribute to the overall negative 
perception. There may not be a total war but certain terrorist groups which have 
emerged in recent decades make this image more vivid. The Israeli presence in the 
Middle East has spawned a large number of Islamic terrorist groups, most notably 
Hamas and Hizbullah. The Westem media is almost at the point of taking for granted 
the violence prevailing in the region because it receives so much coverage. The PLO 
(Palestinian Liberation Organisation) was considered to be a terrorist organisation 
until recently, but is stili blamed by Israel's prime minister Netenyahu for allowing 
terrorist groups to thrive within its borders, if not for directly supporting them.9 Today 
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there is a Palestinian state with Yasser Arafat as its leader, sameone who was once 
considered to be the head of a terrorist organisation. The suicide raids of Hamas and 
Bizbullah mostly on Israeli soldiers and the pictures shown of terrorists holding the 
decapitated heads of Israeli SAS commandos send shivers down peoples spines and 
register in the minds of many Westemers as acts done in the name of Islam. 10 It is not 
difficult to understand through such examples why Islam is seen as aggressive. The 
terrorist organisations above all use the term jihad intheir rhetoric. 
Anather example of the use of the term was in the Soviet - Afghan war 
context. Although at the beginning of the war in the 1970s' the Afghan struggle was 
seen within the cantext of nationalism, in the 1980s' it became more apparent that the 
struggle had more of a 'jihaddist' nature. It was revealed that Afghan soldiers were 
linked with fundamentalist elements in North Afiica, the Middle East and in Bosnia 
after their war. The aid given to them was later questioned. 11 
2.2. ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
Many associate Islam directly with fundamentalism. The term, which does not 
naturally exist in the languages of the Islami c world, is actually taken from Protestant 
Christianity. The great concem for Islam in international politics in the post cold war 
era is basically the concem for political Islam, otherwise Islamic fundamentalism. It is 
used as a modem term for a modem phenomenon. Fuller and Lesser who prefer to use 
the term ''Islamism" deseribe the Islamic fundamentalist mavement as 
" ... political movements based on Islamic principles , 
usually not led by the clergy - who, in fact, often 
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challenge the traditional clergy and their status quo 
outlook - interested in modem mechanisms of publicity 
and mobilisation of the masses, in possession of a 
political agenda that usually goes beyond mere religious 
goals to seek the reform of state and society. These 
movements espouse political, economic, and social 
change, especially in the interests of the lower and 
lower middle class of society."12 
So Islamic fundamentalists are supposedly striving to bring back the roots of Islam 
through modem means by undemıining existing religious authorities, even states. To 
achieve this they often resort to militant and military means. 
Andrea Lueg states that people in the West do not feel Christianina religious 
sense any more, but are rather connected to Christianity in a cultural manner. She 
explains that Islam is not seen as a cultural entity "but as a religion, one which is 
threatening."13 Islamic fundamentalists generally deny anything that is Westem. In 
many Islami c countries they target the secular or pro-Westem regimes that are in 
power becoming at least an indirect threat to the secular West. This is apparent in 
countries like Algeria and Turkey and even Egypt and Saudia Arabia. 
Fundamentalism cannot be attributed to Islam alone. In Christianity and 
Judaism fundamentalist factions are to be found, however, in the media the term is 
used almost exclusively in conjunction with Islam. Popular media prefers to see the 
situation as "Y et, in a sense, Islam is per se fundamentalist... In Islam mosque and 
state are not separated."14 In addition to the quotation's showing Islam and 
fundamentalism as equivalents it also stresses the anti-secular feature of Islam. 
Secularism is attacked by radical Islamists and not by an overwhelming majority of 
Muslims and Islamic states. Countries where Islam constitutes the majority's religion 
show big differences in the attitude towards secularism. Secularism is an unchanging 
component of the Turkish constitution. Even though brought top down by Mustafa 
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Kemal the merits of it are being enjoyed by the Turkish public. That is not to say that 
there are not certain groups within Turkey that are against the Kemalist heritage. And 
there are countries like Iran on the other end of the spectrum that may be called 
"fundamentalist" states. S ince the overthrow of the Shah' s regime by Ayatollah 
Khomeini the country has been outspokenly anti-Westem. 
Puller and Lesser state that one or more fundamentalist states shall emerge in 
the future and that this is likely to happen in countries: 
• "Where population growth is high and the needs of large urbanised 
communities go unmet; 
• Where low standards of living are intensifıed by the appearance of 
pervasive corruption; 
• Where governments have eliminated most meaningful political opposition 
and the lslamists therefore have no rivals; 
• Where governments have used major force to crush the strength of the 
Islamists, thereby only polarising and exacerbating the problem and; 
• Where the Islamists have come to assume the role of sole legitimate 
opposition force in the opinion of the people."15 
Expectations of a proliferation of fundamentalism and states of the kind has priority in 
the agenda of the West which fears it. 
Fundamentalism is a result of recent political, social and bad economic 
conditions. The latter especially stands as an underlying factor. Westem culture has 
gone into the homes of even the remotest of villages in the Islamic world. Television 
programs, imported westem products, people that have been educated abroad have all 
had a positive and negative appeal for the people of these countries. And since, apart 
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from the rich 'oil' states, Islamic countries have not been able to reach a level of 
prosperity prevalent in Westem states, the frustration that this causes feeds the 
fundamentalists' cause. With such an exposure of Westem values and culture some 
people have opted to fınd their identity in a stronger a:ffınity to Islam, something 
which they can cling to and fıght for. Simultaneously, others have chosen to push for 
democracy and the bettering of human rights in their countries. The secular ideologies 
which have been tried such as Marxism, Arab nationalism and others have been 
proved not to work, thus bringing the Islamic model to a prominent level. Islamic 
fundamentalism has deep rooted reasons and is not directly related to the existence of 
the religion. 16 So many writers' explaining Islam in general and Islamic elements 
within their own countries by taking fundamentalist factions as a basis means the 
disregarding of Islam' s histarical development. It is seen as the essence of the religion 
and therefore "fundamentalist positions are transformed into Islamic ones."17 Extreme 
factions are taken as the norm. Ina speech Charles Windsor, Prince of Wales, gave in 
Oxford he states this tendeney as follows: 
"It is like judging the quality of life in Britain by the 
existence of murder and rape, child abuse and drug 
addiction. The extremes exist, and they must be dealt 
with. But when used as a basis to judge a society, they 
lead to distortion and unfaimess."1 
2.3. ISLAMI C IRRA TIONALITY 
Irrationality is also seen as a characteristic of Islam and of Islami c states. After 
the demise of the Soviet Union the spread of nuclear weapons posed an international 
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security problem. The poor economic conditions of Russia and the newly emerging 
republics made the smuggling of nuclear weapons, material and technology inevitable. 
Smugglers of plutonium were reported to be caught on several occasions. Smuggling 
necessitates a consumer of the product and the most feared consumers were lslamic 
states. This fear of an 'lslamic bomb' arose from the perceptions stated before and 
also because Islamic countries and their policy makers are perceived to be irrational. 
Such Islamic countries could use the bomb as a threat to have a stronger say in 
international politics and even use them. Such Islamic countries that are noted to have 
nuclear projects are Libya, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and some of the Central Asian 
states of the former Soviet Union. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons being in 
the hands of countries situated in such unstable regions poses a direct security threat to 
the West. The fact that nuclear weapons have not been used, after the fırst two in 
Japan, during the Cold W ar and later, strengthens the perception of the West intheir 
self appraisal oftheir rational behaviour in contrast with the East's irrationality. 19 This 
furthers polarisation. The inconceivable attack of Saddam Hussain on Kuwait and the 
following Gulf Crisis led people to think what would have happened if Saddam 
possessed nuclear weaponry. The missile attacks on lsrael if made with nuclear 
weapons would have been a world wide disaster. In such a context the irrational 
lslamic state posed a threat not only to the West but to more than that. The Westem 
press, especially the tabloids, now and then come up with terms like 'zealot' and 
'fanatic' in their descriptions of Muslim states and expressions like 'madman', 'the 
butcher of Baghdad', 'mad dog' attributed to Saddam Hussain have strengthened the 
already existing feelings of differentness. 
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2.4. ATTITUDES TOWARDS ELEMENTS OF ISLAM WITHIN 
EURO PE 
Within the light of the general perceptions of the West towards Islam 
mentioned above what is felt for the presence within Europe is on paraUel lines. The 
Muslims in the countries of Westem Europe come from very different backgrounds 
and have differing reasons for being there. However, the perception of their existence 
shows uniformity on certain issues: 
• They increase unemployment. 
• They have a high population growth rate. 
• They are unwilling to integrate. 
• They are engaged ina culturaljihad from within. 
The economic recession that intensifıed in the 1980s' brought tensions to the 
economic life of Westem Europe. Many workers were made redundant, downsizing of 
companies became a hot issue to keep companies going, thus making unemployment 
rates increase. Although not directly responsible for the recession nor the increase in 
unemployment, the Muslims in Europe, together with other non-natives of Westem 
Europe became targets. Workers that were invited to rebuild the new Europe after the 
Second World War, initially thought to be temporary 'Guestworkers' were now the 
unwanted masses. They were occupying positions in business and labour that could 
otherwise be held by the true natives of these countries. Groups that expressed such 
feelings had a point, but the invitation proved to be a permanent staying and the 
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'guests' showed no serious intensions of leaving. The imınigrants themselves had 
established small to quite large businesses and had become an inseparable part of the 
Westem European economy. But growing tensions started to hit them. The most 
notable form of this was the racist attades by neo-nazis on immigrants. Anti Islamic 
propaganda fed the desires of far-right groups and parti es and they gained support and 
popularity.20 Old perceptions of an Islamic threat were conjured up and exploited to 
get more votes - and it worked. 
Another perception of threat of the Westem European states is the growing 
population of Muslim communities. Continuing immigration especially from North 
Africa and the Middle East into Europe through family reunions and others seeking 
political asylum contribute to the existing large numbers. The high reproduction rate 
among Muslim communities, together with the previous factors, has brought the 
number of Muslims in Westem European countries to the following rough fıgures of 
the Iate 1980's and early 1990's: 
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Estiınated numbers of persons with a 
Muslim cultural background in the countries of the E.E.C.22 
Country Number 
Belgiurn 285,000 
Denmark 67,000 
France 3,000,000 
Gerınany 1,700,000 
Greece 120,000 
Ireland missing 
Italy 280,000 
Luxembourg missing 
The Netherlands 400,000 
Portugal 20,000 
Spain 150,000 
United Kingdom 936,000 
Total 6,778,000 
Contrary to the high rise of Muslim populations in Europe the populations of the 
natives are either rising very slowly, not rising or in some cases even decreasing. This 
demographic pressure is that which is felt from within and without. The situation in 
the 'home' countries of most of these Muslims is not very different - again high rates 
of population increase which has made the term "fortress Europe" common in the 
media. Europe is under constant pressure from people wanting to immigrate from the 
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Third World, mostly Muslim countries. Perceptions of threat again come to the fore, 
the threat of a takeover merely by means of reproduction. 
The fast population growth among Muslims in Europe would not have been 
such a big issue if these masses had been willing to integrate or assimiiate into 
European culture and society. In many countries where there has been immigration 
from countries from within the ECC-EU and from ex-communist countries the general 
perception for Muslims is " ... that Muslims are different from the immigrants who 
preceded them, the Poles, the Portuguese or the Jews ... perhaps the Muslims could 
not be integrated after all.',ıı The pressures coming from these immigrants to build 
new mosques, to practice call for prayer, to have their daughters wear headscarves to 
schools, have mescids (prayer facilities) at work and time off for Friday prayer were 
very different from what other immigrant communities demanded. Their existence 
actually required a focus on integration or assimilation while that of others did not -
Islam' s impact on social life needed special treatment. 
A lack of a threat of holy war stemming from outside European borders does 
not mean that the Islamic presence within Europe shall not be perceived as engaged in 
a holy war to culturally penetrate Europe. The understanding of jihad, as previously 
explained, is not only a threat perceived asa possible attack on the West by a coalition 
of Muslim states. Such a possibility is unrealistic, given the diversity of Islamic states 
in the world and ongoing international politics. A more realistic form of jihad that 
shows up in the minds and media of the West is the cultural jihad from Muslim 
communities in the Westem world. Non-military, cultural means of conquest are 
attributed to the Muslims living in the West. A 33 year old Moroccan bookseller who 
has lived in France for ten years explains his understanding ofjihad as follows: 
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"My country is the country of Islam and Muslims. The 
best is to live among Muslims, but he who has a very 
strong faith can lead a better life in non-Muslim 
countries. It is a kind of sacrifıce. It is not a violent war, 
but the war to spread God' s message, the voice of Islam 
and its image. One's education should be Muslim and 
one should be a model for others. Jihad should not be 
with a sword to kill people or to blow up something. 
That is a mistake, and that is not Islam at all. "24 
They are seen as groups of people that are 'here to stay' making the West 
"inescapably linked to alien culture. ,,ıs Their growing population and the mission of 
their religion to convert are seen as a process of undermining European culture, and 
the unemployment and poverty they bring with them when they migrate is seen by 
many Europeans as a threat to European standards of living and wealth. 
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CHAPTER3 
PERCEPTIONS OF MUSLIMS 
The relatively underdeveloped position of the Muslim world taday has led 
most of these countries to walk the inevitable path of modemisation. Muslim 
countries have realised that lagging behind in what modem day technology and 
science has to offer will make them complain even more about their backwardness 
and leave the 'glory of the early days oflslam' as an unregainable past dream. 
Even the most fundamentalist of Islamic states, Iran, is trying to reap its share 
of the good life, although not completely along Westem lines. The country has joined 
the Internet, the latest and most astonishing means of global communication, but has 
had second thoughts of i ts youth having access to the limitless amount of uncensored 
information, some that is not in line with its ideology. Restrictions on the issue have 
been brought. 
This is one of the major items in the Islami c perception of the West. lt is the 
Muslims' self perception of their own backwardness and their will to modemise. 
While doing this Islamic countries wish to do it in their own way. They do not want to 
accept what comes from the West in the form in which the West presents it to them. In 
finding to do this difficult, the Islamic world, even though in differing degrees, has 
come to blame the West for the negative side effects of modemisation. Muslim 
countries feel themselves surrounded by political, military, cultural, social and 
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economic challenges posed by the W est. 1bis in tum leads many Muslim countries to 
indulge in conspiracy theories and even believe in them; that the Christian West is in a 
constant struggle to worsen the backwardness oflslamic countries, culturally infıltrate 
and finally (even) wipe Islam out of this world. 1 
After its fırst few years the Islamic force quickly expanded into a large empire 
which stretched over the whole of North Africa all the way to India and influenced 
parts of South East Asia. By the time it encountered the Catholic West, which is 
today's power, it had become an empire that was militarily strong and very advanced 
in the sciences and arts of the time. The early encounters of Europe and Islam have 
been previously explained in Chapter one. What Islam saw then was a backward 
Europe that was struck with feudal wars, thus making it fragmented. Islam of course 
was not immune to corruption and fragmentation. The Islamic world became divided 
and the pendulum swung towards the path of the Turks in whom Islam found for itself 
a military machine. Europe was stili militarily backward compared to the Muslim 
world. The Ottomans saw Europe as inferior. The Ottomans, for example, considered 
the king of a Christian kingdom to be on the representory level of the Ottoman 
sadrazam (vezir), the second man under the Sultan. The West was perceived asa field 
in which Muslims could expand their House of Islam (Dar al Islam). Then the 
'pendulum of power and strength' swung in favour of the Europeans and has stayed 
there ever since. The Muslims who were feared came to fear Christian Europe. 
Overexpansion, religion, social corruption and other reasons made Ottomans slow to 
react to the scientific and technological advances in Europe after the Renaissance. The 
once admired East became inferior to the West. 
Muslims in return tried to adapt to this change in status quo and towards the 
ı glh and ı 9th centuries started adopting new military technology and culture from the 
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West. They have been doing the same until the present day when the gap between East 
and West is even greater. Muslims came to envy the development in Europe. 
However, this feeling of envy started to mix with that of contempt towards the West 
in the 18th and 19th centuries, the age of colonialism. S. M. Darsh characterises this 
period as one in which there was an attempted Christianisation of Muslims; this was a 
period which followed the decline of the Islami c empires when the Muslims " ... 
closed their eyes after a long era of hard work and intense effort and slept fast and 
deep... they forgot their mission, so they forgot everything. ,,ı Darsh' s writings echo 
the Muslim longing for the 'good old days' and the missionary characteristic of Islam. 
He also sees the colonial period as one in which "The whole Islamic world was, for 
the first time in its history, soon under the control of un-Islamic machinery which was 
totally alien, hostile and unsympathetic to the subjugated faith and its adherents. ,,3 He 
goes on to state that the Muslims had lost the fight both militarily and 'ideologically' 
meaning in the scientific sphere. 
All this points to the reality of what Muslims today feel; that some way or 
another superiority was handed to the West, and taking into consideration that both 
Christianity and Islam have a mission to convert humanity it was not difficult for the 
Islamic world to conceive this takeover of superiority as an aggressive one. What 
followed the start of colonialism until its end in the mid 20th century was perceived as 
the West's exploitation of resources, who were as quoted above, 'unsympathetic to 
other faiths'. The so called Muslim tolerance towards other faiths, especially to those 
of'the book' (Christians and Jews) and the preseribed forbidding offorced conversion 
is always contrasted with the forced conversions of Muslims in Spain, the ousting of 
Jews from Spain to the Ottoman Empire and with the later negative perceptions 
stemming from the colonial period. The West is perceived as a force that is stili trying 
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to dominate, if not territorially, then politically. This is the heritage of the colonial 
period. 
As opposed to the West's perceiving the Islaınic world in a more or less 
uniform way, the perception of the Muslim world of the West varies greatly. While 
some countries like Turkey are actively pro-Westem and are trying to integrate firmly 
into the Westem society of states, there are countries like Iran which are totally 
against the West and are trying to promote their anti-Westem Islamic ideology. Some 
general perceptions, however, may be stated. 
The Islamic world feels that it is under siege from the West and this is seenon 
a number of platforms ranging from the political and military to the social and 
economic. The source of these is the perception that the Muslim world is a victim of 
Westem power. This victimisation is due to the histoncal process that the Islamic 
world has been experiencing in its encounters with the West, and due to the 
psychological effects that this process has imposed on the Muslims' minds. There is 
also the pressure coming from within individual countries, that of modernisation 
which is causing many social and economic problems and all which was begun as a 
response to the fast scientific, economic and technological development of the West. 
The problems taking place because of modernisation are blamed mostly on the West 
sin ce most of them are imported from there. 
3.1. POLITICAL PRESSURES - ARAB ISRAELI DISPUTE 
Political pressures are applied by the West from a number of directions. The 
most immediate of these is the issue of lsrael. Akbar S. Ahmed states that ''the Arabs 
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argue that lsrael was created and is sustained by the West to keep them weak and 
divided.',4 The creation oflsrael after the Second World W ar was indeed a humiliation 
to the Muslim world. The reason for this was because the creation of the state was at 
the expense of Muslim Palestinians' land and because of the occupation of lands 
considered holy. Ahmed deseribes the occupation of Jerusalem as an incident that " ... 
was shocking not only for Arabs but all Muslims eveıywhere."5 He goes on to explain 
how widespread among Muslims the 'holiness' of Jerusalem is, and how he saw 
images, posters and paintings of 'The Dome of the Rock' in various parts of the 
world. Then he explains the "injustice and frustration" he felt and that his feelings 
were what " ... millions of Muslims feel" when he was in Jordan, less than an hour 
away from Jerusalem and could not visit the city. 
The Israeli settlement in Palestine has helped strengthen Arab nationalism in 
the past and today is helping nourish terrorist groups, many of which are Islamic 
fundamentalists. The emotional response to the establishment of lsrael mentioned 
above has made most Muslim states support the Palestinian cause led by Yasser 
Arafat Today he has his own Palestinian state but there are stili many problems. The 
state lsrael still exists and it is perceived to " ... represent more than a militaıy threat" 
because "with Israel came cultural, intellectual and political ideas that were alien to 
Arabs."6 Israel is not only conceived as always associated with the Palestinian 
problem, but as a threat in itself for Arabs. lt is seen as a Westem pillar in Muslim 
lands, a reminder of humiliation, a military and also cultural, political and intellectual 
threat that creates a "... complex hatred among the Arabs that explains their rallying 
behind any Arab leader who is prepared to stand up to lsrael and the West, and the 
two are seen as interchangeable."7 Here we see Judaism within the Westem context; it 
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is not seen as another bloc or individual danger, it is a part of the wider Westem 
world. 
Despite the general hatred oflsrael especially among Arabs, the West has been 
pushing the Muslim world to accept the existence of the state, interact with or at least 
be on good terrns with it. The financial support which the United States gives to many 
Middle Eastem countries is usually given with conditions conceming their relations 
with Israe1.8 Put in another way, money is given for Israel's recognition. This of 
course is not to say that Arabs sat and calmly watched the establishment and 
development of Israel over the years. Wars between the two have ended with the 
humiliation of the Arab world. Arabs have met continuous m.ilitary defeat and the 
Muslim peoples of the region have come to experience "... the Israeli issue as the 
chief facet of relations with Washington and the key source of Westem intervention. 
These are visceral issues, for they relate directly to Muslim soil and Muslim 
refugees. "9 
Another factor that affects the Muslim perception of Westem interventionism, 
dominance and political pressures are the Westem efforts to continue having military 
bases on the territories ofmany Muslim countries. Westem powers, mainly the United 
States, have had bases in Egypt, Libya, Saudia Arabia, Oman, Iran, Jordan, Bahrain, 
Morocco, Turkey and Pakistan at different times. 10 Although these bases have been 
used by local authorities to strengthen their own regimes and powers they have 
popularly been perceived as the exertion of Westem power in Muslim lands, bases 
used for Westem causes not their own and an infringement of their own sovereignty. 
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3.2. ECONOMIC PRESSURES 
Economic pressure put by the West on the Islanıic world also add to the sense 
of siege. The cluınsy economies of the Middle East have made themselves dependent 
on the West and the only important economic leverage the Muslim world possesses is 
that of massive oil reserves. This power has been used in the past. 
Fuller and Lesser state that the supposition of oil states being powerful is not 
true and that the so called oil states have only recently, in the past few decades, gained 
control oftheir oil reserves. They had been used and managed by Westem companies 
for years before they were nationalised. They state that the reserves were riewed as so 
essential to Westem economies that Muslim govemments had very little voice or 
control over them; the colonial heritage had set a strong hand on the resources which 
it did not want to let go of and local govemments were in danger of being overthrown 
if they did not cooperate. ı ı The West, on this issue, is perceived as a group which 
'thinks' it has the right to control what is not its own. The West in the eyes of the 
Muslim states sees the right in itself to control but not be controlled, hence the use of 
the oil weapon. Such an economic intervention met direct reaction from the West: 
"The Saudi imposed oil embargo of ı 973 - ı 974 - the 
only time it has been invoked in the region, and by an 
ally, not an enemy, of the West - unleashed strong 
passions in the West, whose tolerance for the least 
degree of foreign dependency is low, and sparked talks 
ofWestem use of the "food weapon" asa riposte to the 
Middle Eastem "oil weapon"."ı2 
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... 
The West, time and time again, has expressed its will to dominate the oil 
reserves in the region, and its culmination is evident in the Gulf W ar of 1991. The 
Muslim view of the West trying to dominate themis very explicit in Ahmed' s words: 
"In the Gulf War of 1991 we saw how America's 
attempts to maintain global hegemony, to ensure 
continuing supplies of oil so that the high material 
lifestyles of the West could be maintained, were also a 
chance to show who was boss or, as the American 
soldiers put it, to 'kick ass'. For many Arabs who 
opposed Saddam Husain and his policies their 
paradoxical support of Iraq was a gesture of defiance 
against the West."13 
Here we can see the general perception: the feeling of siege and domination 
anda centrasting of the West's 'materiallifestyle' with the implied spiritual one of the 
Muslim. Indeed any resistance to Westem intervention has been applauded by many 
Muslim countries no matter who the leading figure was, "A generation ago Nasser 
symbolised the Arab challenge; in the 1990's it was Saddam Husain."14 Even though 
the state policy of many Muslim countries was pro-Westem and supported the War 
against Iraq, the public response in many Islamic states was in favour of Saddam. He 
became a hero who stood against the West and lsrael even though he lost. This is in 
contrast to the West's hailing of him the 'madman of the Gulf. The Muslim world 
seems to be striving for any success or resistance to the West. While describing the 
effect of the oil-price rises in the early 1970's as the Muslim world's seeming (to the 
West) to remind its early conquests, Edward Said cannot help saying " ... the whole 
West seemed to shudder."15 This both reflects the Muslim world's seeing itself 
inferior to the West and its hunger for retaHation after years ofhumiliation. 
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3.3. THE MUSLIM PERCEPTION OF THE HOST EUROPEAN 
STATE 
The Muslim population in Europe is unique in that it differs from that of the 
United States. Muslims in the United States, apart from the Afro-American 
population, tend to be more upper class citizens compared to the population in 
Europe. America has attracted many doctors, engineers and businessmen from 
Muslim countries and these groups have expressed their eagemess to be a part of the 
mo re general American culture, a phenomenon which is referred to as 'Brain Drain' 
by countries which export these people. The lack of social problems due to poverty, 
unemployment and the like make these people more at peace with the 'host' state. 
However, the situation in Europe is different. The overwhelming majority of Muslims 
in Europe occupy a lower level in society because they were welcomed to do the 
'dirty' work (as the immigrants put it) and most, especially first generation 
immigrants, have remained as the working classes and the unemployed masses. 16 
The demographical situation is also different. Muslims in the U.S. are not 
concentrated in a certain place, whereas they tend to form communities in Europe in 
certain cities. In Europe. they are concentrated in, for example, Berlin in Germany, 
Bradford in the United Kingdom and Paris in France. This leads to the direct 
importation of ethnic and religious culture from the country of origin which these 
concentrated groups try to continue in their new countries. There are enough people in 
such communities to make old traditions and religious sect differences survive and 
even flourish in their new surroundings. This, of course, means the importing of the 
rivalries and other problems together with these people into Europe. 17 Thus, how 
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Musliıns perceive their host state in Europe should be examined within the light of the 
differences between the backgrounds of these groups. There is said to be a lack of 
unity and a lack of a representative figure for these people. This causes problems, for 
example, with the German government in dealing with these Muslim groups. The 
demands of the sunnite 'Milli Görüş' organisation coınmon among Turkish Musliıns 
differs from that of the Muslims from Morocco. Each requires to be dealt with 
individually. However, some general lines concerning the overall perception of the 
host state in Europe may be drawn. 
The first and most prominent is the worry that especially first generation 
Muslims have. That is that their children are attracted to the culture that they are 
living in and are increasingly distancing themselves from their Muslim identity. There 
is a fear of total integration, absorption and assimilation of minorities that want to 
preserve their cultural identity. 18 The challenge that is posed by Westem notions of 
secularism, pluralism, tolerance and overall European culture is great, and the reaction 
to these challenges vary widely. While some Muslims in the second and next 
generations accept such values and want to be a part of the dominant culture, others 
from the same generations opt for the more extreme: fundamentalism, and the 
separatism which accompanies it. An Islamİst Egyptian writer states the situation in 
France as follows: 
"Assimilation, or the cultivation of a "special, 
domesticated" strain of Islam that conforms to the host 
society, is something else altogether. It is aimed at 
"fragmentation and secession" from Islam and is meant 
to sap the faith of its "true content," "gradually 
uprooting it." And that is the challenge facing the 
Muslims of France today ... " 19 
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Such groups with a separatist tendeney deseribe themselves as endangered species and 
state they have autonomy regarding their own goals and their domestic and 
international relations, and state their sensitivity on social, religious, educational and 
sexual issues.20 
Another perception is that they are unwanted. They were once welcomed to 
rebuild the post World W ar Euro pe, and now that the process is over they want to be 
thrown out. This perception was aggravated by the rise of European racism in the 
1 980s'. It was symbolised by the emerging ofNeo-Nazi groups in Germany and ultra-
right political parties like that of Le Pen in France.21 Although these extreme factions 
are not popular among native Europeans there is a growing negative atmosphere 
conceming foreigners, especially Muslims. Muslims have come to fear skin-head 
mobs some of whom have killed. This of course increases polarisation and leads to 
forming of groups among Muslims that want to fıght fire with fire. This is a very 
common phenomenon in the ghettos of European cities. 
There is also the fact that Muslims in Europe are living in a secular 
environment where they are free to practice their religion to a certain extent, in some 
cases even more than they could in their native countries. They are building mosques 
and schools where they teach their language and religion, the extent of which differs 
from one European state to another. Those who fınd it easier to live in Europe, S. M. 
Darsh, states are those who were minorities in their countries of origin: "They are, out 
of past experience, conscious of their statusasa minority, and are keen to preserve 
cultural elements, social norms, and religious traditions in their new environment. ,,n 
Muslim writers state that there is a decline in strict adlıerence to Islamic values, a 
decline in daily prayer practice and an increase in drinking, dating and dancing. 23 This 
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of course inclicates the increasing trend among the new Muslim generations to 
integrate into European society. 
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CHAPTER4 
COMING TO TERMS 
The growing presence of Muslim people in Europe and the fact that they are 
'there to stay' has posed a great challenge to European states and to the Muslim 
residents. It has been stated that the perceptions of both sides are largely negative of 
each other, wrought with suspicion at the least. Nevertheless, there have been attempts 
to meet this challenge and European states have had to adjust their internal policies in 
view of the increasing demands of the Muslim communities. Although there has been 
a lot of public resentment towards these communities, European states have had to 
find a way to continue the smooth flow of social life and have responded to the 
challenge in differing ways. The process of integrating or assimilating the Muslim 
populations is continuing, although with disruptions; they are stili trying to fınd better 
ways of living together. This chapter shall try to highlight this process by first trying 
to give an overview of the constitutional and legal traditions in regard to relations 
between state and religion of several European countries which have a considerable 
Muslim population. It shall then concentrate on the different models of interaction 
with Muslims undertaken by these states, namely assimHation and integration. Special 
emphasis shall be given to France which has opted for the former and the Netherlands 
which has preferred the latter. 
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4.1. RELIGION AND STATE IN WESTERN EUROPE 
It has been discussed earlier that Europe today is a secular society and that 
religion (Christianity) has ceased to be a religion and is more of a cultural 
phenomenon. In its broad sense this is true, but the secularism of the individual 
European states shows slight differences in their constitutions and legal traditions and 
this, to a significant extent, determines their behaviour towards their Muslim 
populations. 
Belgium is a constitutionally secular country. Belgium has no state religion 
and the state is neutral in all religious matters. All religions are free within the 
boundaries ofBelgian public law. Foreigners living in Belgium are also subject to this 
freedom as well as its obligations. However, in order to obtain :financial assistance 
from the state to pay the salari es of priests and imams, or build religious premises for 
instance, the religion has to be recognised by the law. In line with this rule the Roman 
Catholic, Protestant, Anglican, Jewish, Orthodox and Islamic religions and sects have 
been recognised. 1 
Denmark shows a slight difference. Due to the fact that 91.5% of the Danish 
population is registered as members of the E vangelical Lutheran Church, the state has 
announced this as the national church. Although this means that the state is not neutral 
in religious affairs it has incorporated freedom of religion in its constitution. This 
freedom, however, is characteristically restricted. Other religious communities such as 
the Roman Catholics, Methodists, Baptists and Jews are recognised coınmunities of 
faith. They can, for example, celebrate religious marriages with 'civil effect'. Such 
recognition has not been given to Muslims yet. It may be said that religious freedom in 
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Denmark is more of a 'gesture' rather than a constitutional right. The state finances 
more than 80% of the expenses of the Lutheran Church but the minority religions have 
to pay for their own expenditures. The state, does though, partly finance the schools 
that these minorities have a right to establish. 2 
The German constitution recognises the freedom of religion and philosophy of 
life. The interaction between the state and religious groups is based on certain 
principles. The first is the separation of state and religion and the prohibition of a state 
church. The second is the neutrality of the state in its dealings with different religious 
communities. The third is the right to self-determination of the various religious 
communities in their internal matters as long as they do not conflict with existing 
laws. All religions, whether they are organised or not have the right to express their 
views on problems which have a political nature. In order for religious communities to 
be subsidised by the government for expenditures related with religious education, 
burials, cemeteries and premises they have to be recognised as 'Corporations ofPublic 
Law'. In this sense the German state does not legally discriminate among religions. 3 
According to the French constitution France is a 'laicist' republic and is 
neutral in its dealings with religion. The state, within the limitations of public order, 
guarantees the freedom of religion, conscience and the activities of religious 
communities. A sharp distinction between the secularism of France and other 
European nations is that it does not recognise, nor does it fınancially subsidise any 
religion. But the state does subsidise the protection of religious freedom and finances 
spiritual care at public institutions, hospitals, prisons, the army and public schools. As 
long as they are considered public property, the state also fınances the maintenance of 
religious buildings and may give loans for their construction. It may also give loans to 
private schools and make tax reductions for various religious associations. Religious 
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associations are not permitted to perform social, educational and economic activities. 
A civil association, on the other hand cannot engage in religious activity.4•5 
The legal situation in the Netherlands is similar to that of Gennany. There is 
freedom of religion and the separation between state and church. There is the principle 
of non-discrimination between religions and equal treatment for all. lt differs on the 
principle that religious groups can establish their own schools but are fully subsidised 
by the state. 6 
The United Kingdom has no constitution. But the principle of religious 
freedom has been dealt with in special laws and international treaties to which the 
U.K. isa party. The official state church is the Church of England in England and the 
Church of Scotland in Scotland. The monarch is the head of both. However, the state 
does not, in principle, finance the activities of these churches, such as salary payments 
to the clergy. This is achieved by the revenues from their own properties. The 
situation of other religions is sornewhat blurry and is mostly left to the discretion of 
local authorities. 7 
The situation of Muslims in this legal context varies with the country involved. 
They seem to have the most state hacking in the Netherlands where there is full 
fmancial support for the institutions they establish, whereas most states do not give 
support as such. The situation is complicated by the fact that most Muslims in 
Western Europe have a foreigner status and are not citizens of the country they reside 
in. Thus, the lack of political representation makes the changing of these laws difficult 
in the foreseeable future. However, the secular nature of all ofthese states gives them 
the freedom to practice their religions as long as these activities abide with the relative 
national laws. 
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The fact that the various constitutions and laws guarantee the religious 
freedom of Muslims in Westem Europe does not mean that sociallife in Europe with 
regard to the Muslim population shall run smoothly. Certain events like the headscarf 
affair in France and the buming of Salman Rushdie's book The Satanic Verses in 
Britain are indications that the situation is not so. Within the light of this reality 
European states are trying to find ways of providing a better functioning of social life 
for their minorities. They are, thus, adopting certain means of dealing with them, 
namely assimHation and integration. 
4.2. ASSIMILATION MODEL 
According to this model of dealing with the effects of immigration, 
immigrants are seen as permanent residents. This is the situation prevalent in France 
where the state is trying to, as quickly as possible, incorporate immigrants into French 
society. One way of doing this is by keeping the legal structure as non-discriminatory 
as possible between foreigners and the original French population. This model, 
however, seems to work for immigrants who are willing to adapt to the new cultural 
and social environment but tends to fail for those groups who are keen on preserving 
their own cultural identities. 8 
Muslims in France are mainly of North African origin. The French colonial 
presence in the 'Maghreb' started the process of immigration of these people very 
early, at the beginning of the 20th century, and it has continued ever since. In the 
heydays of French colonialism in North Africa leading politicians deseribed France as 
a great Islamic power.9 lt was in this spirit and as early as the end of World War I that 
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the Mosque of Paris was built. Many Muslim men had been conscripted into the 
French army and had di ed for its cause. People of the Islamic faith had made their way 
into the French machineıy. 
Until the beginning of the 1960's most immigration from North A:frica was 
from Algeria. Until 1957 more than 190,000 Algerians had crossed the Mediterranean 
and in the following decades this fıgure rose to about a quarter of a million. 10 Most of 
these first comers were the har/ds who today amount to around a population of 
400,000 a:fter family reunions. 11 They are also known as 'Français Musulmans' or as 
the more official term states: 'Rapatries d'Origine Nord-A:fricaine' or RONA, which 
means ''those of North African origin repatriated to France at the end of the Algerian 
war ofindependence in 1962."12 These were people who had to leave Algeria because 
they had, in one way or another, been associated with the French rule in Algeria, the 
colonial regime. Algerians in France today total to a population of around 800,000 and 
are the most numerous group in the country. The French legal system has made it 
possible for many of the Muslims bom in France or who have lived a long time in 
France to become French nationals. French Muslims today amount to around 400,000 
people. 13 Even though, to many Muslims, the adoption of French nationality may 
mean becoming Christian, the French govemment, very much in the American sense, 
has made this choice available for these people; something that Muslims in other 
European states are striving to get as a right but cannot 
The remaining Muslims in France are the Tunisians, who approximate to 
around 250,000, Moroccans - 450,000, Turks - 120,000 and West Africans around 
100,000 persons. The latest fıgures show the total number of Muslims in France to be 
around 3,000,000 including those from the Middle East and French converts that are 
approximately 30,000.14 The Tunisian, Moroccan, Turkish and West African 
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immigrants have mostly immigrated recently and are less integrated into the French 
system compared to the Algerians. Most of these groups retain strong ties with their 
home countries and express desire to return. Thus there is a low proportion of 
nationals among this group. 
It is the 'Harkis' who have accepted assimHation the most. Since they have no 
fantasy of going back to Algeria they have become such a part of the French culture 
that second generation Harkis have a growing tendeney to give their children French 
names instead of Muslim ones. ıs The periodical rituals of Islam are practised less and 
less among the young generation. The first few practises that are abandoned are the 
han on alcohol, having to eat 'halal' food, five time daily prayers, the 'zekat' and the 
pilgrimage. Observances that are usually adhered to are accepting one is Muslim, not 
eating pork and fasting in Ramadan. The knowledge of Islam among the young 
generation is declining together with the knowledge of Arabic. 16 The will to integrate 
into French culture can go as far as young Muslims' making their first names French: 
''N arda becomes Dora, Djenane becomes Gina or Anne, Mohammed becomes Medi or 
Maurice."17 
The legal system's making French nationality readily available to the second 
and next generations has not made these people totally accepted as French among 
original French citizens. Approximately one million young Muslims in France have 
dual nationality. 18 But the desire of the state to assimiiate these new generations into 
the French society has met a ghetto response in the opposite direction. 
Fundamentalism is also a phenomenon in which these young people who are 
undergoing an identity erisis try to fınd a sense of belonging. Some acts of violence, 
especially that of the Paris Metro bombing, have been linked with Islamic 
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fundamentalists. But it seems that the growing tendeney for the future is towards the 
success of further assimilation: 
"a new kind of ethnic identity, a characteristically American 
kind, which in the place of attachment to a specifıc national 
and religious identity takes the form of shared fellowship as a 
sub-culture within the dominant culture, seems likely to 
prevail among the young Arabs (and Blacks) of the urban 
zones, who are casualties of the integration process."19 
4.3. ETHNIC MINORITIES- INTEGRATION MODEL 
The French system is one which is trying to form a French Islam and make 
French culture dominate others in order to get rid of the pains of immigration. One 
drawback of this model is that it meets strong opposition from those Muslims who 
cling strongly to their ethnic and religious identities. This is the problem that the 
ethnic minorities model aims to cope with; cultural differences. The state in this 
model sets conditions for people so that they are able to preserve their cultural 
identities. This model is what has been undertaken by the Netherlands.20 
Muslim imınigration to the Netherlands started after 1945 and most of the fırst 
comers were from South East Asia. They were coming from countries like Indonesia, 
Suriname, but thebulkof the Muslims came later from Turkey and Morocco in 1989. 
This amounted to 176,500 Turks and 139,000 Moroccans.21 In the same year the total 
number of Muslims of foreign origin totaled to 405,000. Approximately 3000 Dutch 
converts were also counted. 
The economic recession m the early 1970's led the govemınent of the 
Netherlands to put restrictions on foreign workers' rights in order to encourage their 
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returo to their countries. This, however, did not work, and by ı 98 ı the government 
changed its policy towards integration and in ı 986 gave foreigners the right to vote 
and be elected to local councils.22 
Indeed, until the end of the ı 970s', the Netherlands did not consider itself a 
country of immigration. The country was seen to already possess a dense population 
and even the workers themselves were convinced that they would one day returo to 
their countries. Initially the Netherlands had adopted a 'Guestworker' policy in line 
with the German model. Although this was the case, the Netherlands also incorporated 
into this policy the provision of some welfare benefits for their temporary workers 
who were seen as people in need of care. 23 Social work agenci es, fully subsidised by 
the state, engaged in the counselling of immigrants. These immigrants were 
approached in accordance with their own culture which it was thought would reinforce 
their desires to returo to their countries. With the same idea and wish in mind they 
enabled the opening of primary schools which taught in the mother tongue of the 
children. When family reunions started to increase and it was understood that 
immigration was permanent, a report was published in ı 979 that recommended the 
"abandoning [of] the tiction of temporary residence and 
developing integration policy for the immigrants. The 
aim of such a policy would be to promote the migrants' 
fuller participation in social and economic life, as well 
as to develop their cultural identity insofar as this 
would not hamper their integration."24 
The 'Minorities Policy' was officially launched in 1983.25 
Lewis and Schnapper state that the minorities policy applies only to those ' for 
whose presence the government feels (because of the colonial past or because they had 
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been recruited by the authorities ), and who find themselves in a minority situation; 
and as minorities he lists Surinamese, Antilleans and Arubans, Moluccans, Turks, 
Moroccans, ltalians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Greeks, (former) Yugoslavs, Tunisians, 
Cape Verdians, Gypsies and Tinkers.26 These peoples estimate to be around ı ,038,400 
as of ı992.27 
The minorities policy consists of three main elements: 
ı- Promoting multiculturalism and the emancipation of ethnic communities. 
2- Promoting equality before the law. 
3- Overcoming social and economic deprivation by promoting equal 
opportunity. 28 
The Netherlands has deseribed itself as a pluralistic society in which no 
specific culture is and shall be dominant. In order to maintain this feature in their 
society, the Netherlands has promoted the continuation of the policy of the 1970s' 
which is aimed at preserving and devetoping the cultures of immigrants. Mother 
tongue teaching was given more emphasis and the establishment of Muslim schools 
was accelerated. Promoting multiculturalism was also carried out through national and 
local 'consultative councils' whose members are delegates of immigrant associations 
which have to be consulted by authorities whenever a measure that shall affect 
minorities is to be taken. 29 
Equality before the law is provided by giving foreign citizens the rights and 
obligations that are valid for the citizens of the Netherlands. Laws regarding the 
practice of certain religious and cultural chores have been made like those pertaining 
to burials and slaughtering. The public service now also accepts foreign residents with 
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some exceptions like the police and anned forces. Another important development in 
this area is the granting of voting rights to foreigners who have lived in the 
Netherlands for at least 5 years. Together with voting rights the right to be elected was 
also granted, however, both rights are limited to municipalities and districts. Only 
Dutch citizens possess the right to vote in the national elections. Foreigners who have 
voted in their limited areas were observed to vote for the more established parties and 
not for immigrant parties.30 Since obtaining Dutch citizenship is quite easy and not 
very expensive, many foreigners have obtained it despite the Dutch policy of equal 
treatment and opportunity. The country has also accepted double citizenship, so it may 
be expected that more and more foreigners will become citizens of the Netherlands. 
The last element of the minorities policy, that of overcoming social and 
economic deprivation by promoting equal opportunity has been the least successful 
ambition. The intention seems to be to keep life standards of immigrants high even 
though they cling to their own cultures, which they are also promoted to do. Since this 
ambition is clearly on the social and individual level it is more diffıcult to control than 
the other two elements which are more on the government level. This is the level of 
employer and employee, and peer relationships between school children. Even though 
the law may grant equal opportunity, how this is reflected in actual daily life may 
vary. Unemployment, for example, is stili high among immigrants and it is the same 
for school drop-outs due to the lack of a suffıcient knowledge of Dutch.31 This seems 
to be a point where a more rigid form of integration - an approach closer to 
assimilation, it seems would work better. Enabling and promoting the preservation of 
culture and religion for immigrants and expecting the majority of the Dutch to accept 
these people as they are, are different things. 
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This system of course is not void of flaws. Fully insisting on multiculturalism 
could mean the continuation of marginalism between foreigners and Dutch people 
even if citizenship was acquired. lt is a known fact that there are many immigrants in 
Europe that stili cannot speak the language of their host country despite having lived 
there for over 20 years. Growing unemployment and other social diseases would lead 
these 'lost' masses to either del ve into the world of social decadence like drug abuse 
and seliing or could lead them to look for other identities, with for example Islamic 
fundamentalists whose language and behaviour are more familiar. 
The ethnic minorities model risks the marginalisation of the masses that are 
not active in Dutch social life, but has attracted the attention of countries like the 
United K.ingdom and Scandinavian countries. 32 lt has worked to a great extent and is 
the express manifestation of a total acceptance of Muslim people within a Christian 
society, and the will to incorporate them into their society without having them lose 
their Muslim identities. Countries like Germany who are stili trying to make the myth 
of temporary immigration live in the notion and widely used vocabulary of 
'Gastarbeiter' it seems will definitely come to terms with the Muslim population in 
their countries and fınd solutions for the better functioning of their 'new' societies. 
Europe has changed; the second largest religion today in the continent is Islam and it 
is evident that both the 'host' and the 'guest' are trying to find ways to overcome or at 
least !essen the distinctions between them. Both groups are today forced to understand 
each other, not the way they want to perceive each other or what false histories have 
taught them, but a true understanding free of prejudices of the other to nurture 
peaceful coexistence. 
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CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSION 
Events like the war in Bosnia to which Westem governments failed to react to 
as they did to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait have led to the proliferation of theories 
envisaging a 'clash of civilisations'. Such events recuperate in the Muslim world as the 
awakening of an aggressive Christendom, and are seen as the continuation of the 
Crusades. Today, with the lack of a Soviet Union to blame or cling to, ideological 
clashes easily transform into ethnic and religious ones. The West, on the other hand, 
sees countries like Iran as anatberna to what they have been building since the fall of 
the Roman Empire. Westem values of democracy, human rights, secularism and 
others which are often considered to be universal, are challenged by Islamisı countries 
which are considered to constitute a threat to Westem civilisation. Both spheres are 
wary of each other and they both carry a cultural baggage full of misperceptions 
canceming the other. The baggage has been filling up for centuries and has now 
started to burst showing what each has kept inside for so long. Technology has 
reached such a level that indifference to the 'other' today is almost impossible. 
Showing the West or Islam as 'the new enemy' is the negative result oftoday's 
interaction between the two spheres. Having realised that they are closer than ever, 
even within each other, they are trying to create easily consumable images of the other 
which history has labelled 'evil' and 'enemy'. The West generally sees the Muslim 
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world as aggressive, irrational, intolerant, backward and cruel to women. The Muslim 
world on the other hand perceives today's Westem world as a social ruin, where 
family life is deteriorating, a place where material well being prevails over spirituality 
and as a power that is trying to dominate the Muslims. Both fumish the media with 
pictures and slogans that contribute to the overall bad image. The lack of an 
understanding of each other and a will to achieve this has turned the situation into a 
vicious cycle; whatever the other does it is often interpreted to the effect of reinforcing 
existing perceptions. 
This is not to say that both sides have totally misunderstood each other. States 
with a Muslim majority in general do have a bad record of human rights, and certain 
groups have been involved in acts of terrorism and mass killings. Women have been 
suppressed in some Muslim countries as in the most recent example of the Talihan 
experience in Afghanistan. Westem nations also have a tendeney to put pressure on 
the Muslim world for their oil and make them get on better with Israel. If the two 
groups were to take a more objective look at each other and themselves they would 
see that they are not very different regarding many of the negatives they attribute to 
each other. 
The experience in Europe is showing positive signs for the future. Muslims on 
the continent have come from very different backgrounds and are living in an 
environment which has been Christian for centuries. Islam in a Christian society is 
seen to be evolving and developing, and it is this change that may find a retleetion on 
the more international level. An Islam that could evolve to be in harmony with 
European values could set the foundations for a more global coming to terms of the 
West and the Muslim world. 
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The settlement of Muslims in Europe has posed a challenge to both Muslims 
and the countries that they are living in. lt seems inevitable, and indeed is natural, that 
Muslims shall be the side that will have to adapt more to their new surroundings. 
Traditional Muslim institutions such as the mosque and more recent forms like certain 
organisations are changing while trying to respond to the needs different from those of 
the past. 
Adaptation of Muslims is affected by certain realities. One, as stated before, is 
the fact that these groups have different backgrounds. The needs and desires of a 
Muslim from Morocco differs from that of a Muslim from Indonesia. Another reality 
is the young Muslim population in Europe that has been brought up or bom there. 
This group has been educated in a European system and they have experienced a 
wider European society, nothing like what the previous generations went through. 
S ince most of them remain Muslim they are analysing their religion and culture so it 
may continue to have meaning to themselves and their children. A more rational and 
practical Islam that appeals to today' s society seems to be evolving. 
The European experience has not taken place without diffıculties. The Muslim 
youth in Europe continues to be highly unemployed. Some groups have totally 
rejected the society they are living in and have preferred to join fundamentalist groups 
who have separatist tendencies. Events like the Rushdie affair and the various 
'headscarf affairs' shall continue to pose a challenge to the integration process. 
Even though the attitude of European states may not have changed very much 
since Muslims first started to migrate to the continent at the beginning of the century, 
the treatment of the states has changed a great deal. In some European countries the 
Muslim population was considered to be temporary when they were invited and most 
states thought they would retum after they had fulfilled their function. However, they 
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are more and more coming to realise that the 'Gastarbeiter' is there to stay and that 
they have growing needs which have to be met. Pushing the immigrant population 
towards marginalisation, they figured, would cause more problems in the long run. 
Other European countries who did not pursue a 'Guestworker' policy like France and 
the United Kingdom also understood that the Muslim population needed special 
treatment. 
For this reason states have produced certain policies in order to overcome the 
problem of further alienation of their immigrant comınunities, most of whom are 
Muslim, and provide legal, social and cultural means for a better integration of these 
people. The most notable of the models they came up with was assimHation and the 
ethnic minorities - integration models. 
The first, which has been adopted by France, tries to integrate the immigrants 
as quick as possible into the dominant culture. It wants to see distinctions between 
different groups !essen for a more smoothly running society. The ethnic minorities 
model, which has been adopted by the Netherlands, aims to have immigrants preserve 
their culture and religion within the context of a pluralistic society. They are provided 
ease in establishing their own schools, religious organisations and institutions. The 
idea is that they will gradually adapt to the new environment, and problems related 
with integration shall remain low because they will continue to have the option of 
preserving their original identities. 
Both models have flaws. The French model does not provide much for people 
who do not want a quick change, who do not want to become French overnight. The 
Dutch model provides for the maintaining of diversity, which may be a problem for an 
individual who wants to have a better place in society but does not speak the language 
of the country he lives in. This is why both countries are opting to fınd a milder way 
52 
to deal with these people. The French are trying to give more opportunities for 
immigrants to preserve their cultures, and the Dutch want to go for a stronger 
integration policy so immigrants may occupy a better place in society. 
The Muslim presence in Europe is growing. Only this fact is enough for both 
Europeans and Muslims to focus on a better and true understanding of each other in 
order to create a better common future for themselves. Within this context the Islamic 
presence in Europe may be decisive for the more general, global coming to terms of 
the West and the Islamic World. 
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